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Abstract
The substantial turmoil created by both 2000 dot-com crash and
2008 subprime crisis has fueled the belief that the two classical paradigms
of economics, which are the invisible hand and the rational agent, are
not appropriate to describe market dynamics and should be aban-
doned at the benefit of alternative new theoretical concepts. At odd
with such a view, using a simple model of choice dynamics from socio-
physics, the invisible hand and the rational agent paradigms are given
a new legitimacy. Indeed, it is sufficient to introduce the holding of
a few intermediate mini market aggregations by agents sharing their
own private information, to recenter the invisible hand and the ratio-
nal agent at the heart of market self regulation including the making
of bubbles and their subsequent crashes. In so doing, an elasticity is
discovered in the market efficiency mechanism due to the existence
of agents anticipation. This elasticity is found to create spontaneous
bubbles, which are rationally founded, and at the same time, it pro-
vokes crashes when the limit of elasticity is reached. Although the
findings disclose a path to put an end to the bubble-crash phenom-
ena, it is argued to be rationality not feasible.
Key words: invisible hand, rational agent, bubbles, crashes, sociophysics,
choice dynamics
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1 The invisible hand and the rational agent
In the last decades several crises in the financial world with subsequent heavy
damages in the labor market and economy growth have put at stake the two
classical paradigms of economics which are the invisible hand, the rational
agent and their driving to associated equilibrium states [1] . Indeed, the sub-
stantial turmoil created by the 2000 dot-com crash and 2008 subprime crisis
have shaken quite many economists and financial analysts leading them to
believe that those classical two paradigms should be abandoned at the bene-
fit of alternative new theoretical concepts. At the heart of the questioning is
the fundamental incapacity of neoclassical theory to embody the formation
of bubbles and their following crashes, stating that equilibrium is always pre-
vailing thanks to the existence of precisely the invisible hand and the rational
agent. Before the recent 2000 and 2008 crashes a good deal of works had
been performed to study bubbles formation and their bursts by physicists
[2, 3, 4, 5] as well by economists [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
At odd with such innovative prevailing views, we present a model inspired
from sociophysics [14, 15, 16, 17, 18], which produces bubbles as equilibrium
states of a given market and crashes as the emergence of a new equilibrium.
The model is rooted in neoclassical economy combined with the Galam model
of opinion dynamics as the underline mechanisms leading to the step by
step aggregation of individual choices towards the final collective equilibrium
state. Accordingly, the invisible hand and the rational agent paradigms are
shown to be indeed responsible in the making of market bubbles as well as in
the associated crashes. Indeed the existence of an elasticity, together with a
limit of the possible amplitude, in the market efficiency is uncovered driven
by the making of local market efficiencies implemented by agent rationality.
To substantiate above surprising claim, it is enough to enlarge the perime-
ter of agent rationality to incorporate as self-interest the confrontation of ones
own actual decision to those of some other peer agents on the same market
or asset restoring the concept of market self regulation.
The main hypothesizes and the underlying model of individual choice ag-
gregation are presented in next Section. The model is solved in third Section
while the fourth Section introduces the existence of an elasticity in the effi-
ciency of the market with respect reaching the fundamental values providing
a theoretical basis to Keynes statement about the possible departure of stock
prices from their fundamental values [19, 20]. The instrumental role of an-
ticipation is emphasized in the process of bottom up aggregation of agent
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individual choices. The limit of elasticity is evaluated in Section fifth and
last Section contains some concluding remarks.
2 Model and main hypothesizes
At the heart of market behavior in addition to the economical reality stands
human behavior and to study human behavior stands sociophysics. What
is sociophysics ? It is the use of concepts and techniques from Statistical
Physics to describe some social and political behaviors. It does not aim at
an exact description of the reality but at singling out some basic mechanics
which may be rather counter intuitive. Initiated more 33 years ago [21, 22],
it has started to become a main stream of research only in the last decade
[14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
Sociophysics deals with a rather large spectrum of problems including
group decision making, coalition forming, terrorism, hierarchical voting, net-
works, linguistic, religion spreading, evolution, and finance should be in-
cluded. One main focus is opinion dynamics, where models looks for generic
mechanisms, which can be at work for a series of different public problems
as Social, Political, Ecological, Societal, Economical, Behavioral, Innovation,
Smoking, Rumors, Marketing, and Financial [23, 24, 25, 26, 27].
The background of the model is a bare frame of bimodal opinion dynamics
in which agents are defined as rational. A rational agent has an opinion and
advocates for it. However, although a rational agent has a well grounded
opinion, it is aware that the information it has access to is limited and may
be misleading. Accordingly, it is susceptible to shift to the other opinion, if
given more arguments for it. As it wants to make the best choice to optimize
its profit, a rational agent does confront its current choice to the choices of
other agents chosen from its social network. We consider that given a group
of agents checking their mutual choices, each one advocating for its own
choice, they end up following the local majority of initial choices. Therefore
a rational agent updates its opinion by following the majority opinion from
a group of selected agents including its own opinion. The update process
produces a local polarization. Since, we have no access to the details of each
agent discussions, we assume the groups are formed randomly.
However, within above framework, given an even size group, considering
one agent one vote, a local tie may occur, with as many arguments in favor
of buying a given asses as in favor of selling it. At this stage we make the
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additional hypothesis that the group of agents at a tie decides to lift the
associated doubt aligning along the leading anticipation trend among them.
If two agents are selling and two are buying, within a shared positive antici-
pation, the two sellers shift to two buyers and vice-versa in case of a shared
negative anticipation. The introduction of possible tie, which in turn creates
a local collective doubt, which is eventually turned to a common choice along
the leading shared anticipation, makes the model counter-intuitive and non-
trivial. Putting the process of local updates in equation leads to a threshold
dynamics with a tipping point, which may be located anywhere between zero
and one, depending on the group size distribution and the average market an-
ticipation. Above the tipping point the update process increases the value of
the relevant quantity and below the tipping point, the quantity is decreased.
Our two main hypothesizes can be formulated as follows:
(i) The fundamental value of an asset or a stock is not accessible at once
directly. All the information required to access to it is scattered into
pieces of information among all the agents, which thus have all indi-
vidual incomplete data. Accordingly, the total aggregation of all those
pieces of information, which is revealed indirectly in the market value
at the opening, contains the position of the current price fixing with
respect to the fundamental value. Based on their respective private in-
formation some agents reach the right choice of selling or buying while
others reach the wrong decision of buying or selling.
If the proportion of initial buyers b0 (with a proportion (1−b0) of initial
sellers) is larger than fifty percents, the current price is underpriced.
As a net result of the excess of buyers over the sellers the price should
go up validating the market efficiency. In contrast, if the proportion of
initial buyers b0 (with a proportion (1− b0) of initial sellers) is smaller
than fifty percents, the current price is overpriced. As a net result of
the deficit of buyers over the sellers the price should go down validating
again the market efficiency.
(ii) Once every agent came out with its initial choice, to buy or to sell, it
wants to get a kind of extra-check by creating a mini market aggregating
a few other agent choices. In case of a local majority in favor of buying
or selling, the agent adopt the majority choice. However in case of a
local tie with the same number of buyers and sellers, the agent adopt
the choice in adequacy with the current leading anticipation of the
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market about the given stock or asset. Every agent repeats this local
market updating some number of times before the market closure.
Common beliefs towards anticipation vary depending on the stock and
the general perception about the near future of the market as a whole.
For balanced anticipations, in case of a doubt, agents keep on their
respective opinions. For positive anticipation, in case of a doubt, agents
choose to buy. For negative anticipation, in case of a doubt, agents
choose to sell.
3 The model
By definition a rational agent reaches the right decision, to buy or sell a
given asset,upon the analysis of its individual private information combined
with the common information available to everyone. However, its private
information is piecemeal since the complete information which determines
the actual corresponding fundamental value is not accessible at once to one
person, being fragmented into many pieces of different contents and mean-
ings. Accordingly some agents end up making the wrong true decision with
respect to the asset while indeed doing the right decision according to their
incomplete information. The market thus happens as the mean to aggregate
all agent individual choices to access the true choice. Aggregating all buyers
and sellers yields a net pressure on the price at time t = 0 given by,
p0 ≡ b0 − (1− b0) = 2b0 − 1, (1)
which is a real number satisfying −1 ≤ p0 ≤ 1 with b0 being the proportion
of buyers at time t = 0 (0 ≤ b0 ≤ 1 ) and (1− b0) the proportion of sellers. A
positive pressure p0 ≥ 0 means the current price is undervalued with respect
to the fundamental value while a negative value p0 ≤ 0 means the current
price is overvalued with respect to the fundamental value.
Nevertheless, the signal given by the pressure p0 is fuzzy since when 0 <
p0 < 1 the market message about the current price is only probabilistic. For
instance a value p0 = 0.70 indicates that there is a chance of 70% that the
price is undervalued and 30% that it is overvalued. At this point the market
efficiency comes into play using agents trading to transform the probabilistic
mere aggregation into a clear cut signal which, at time T is either buy (pT =
1) or sell (pT = 0) at 100% certainty. In between p0 and pT the market is
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volatile with agents buying and selling before stabilization is reached with a
limit up or down, i.e., (pT = 1) or (pT = 0).
To monitor the transformation of the probabilistic signal p0 into a deter-
ministic signal (pT = 1) or (pT = 0), agents create a series of mini markets to
confront their respective choices. To implement those mini-markets, agents
gather into small groups to confront their respective choices, thus aggregating
their private information to reach a new common rational choice.
To visualize the process, without loosing in robustness and generality,
let us assume for illustration and simplicity of the calculations, that agents
gather by groups of 4 respectively to gather their private information to
update their individual choices. Given an initial proportion of buyers b0 at
time t = 0, one round of local updates leads o a new proportion of buyers b1
at time t = 1,
b1 = b
4
0 + 4b
3
0(1− b0) + 6(1− k)b20(1− b0)2, (2)
where local groups are formed randomly. Last term includes the tie case (2
buyers - 2 sellers). In case of a tie, all 4 agents are doubting collectively. At
that moment doubting agents shift the doubt aligning along the choice in
tune with the leading collective anticipation. A generalized optimistic antici-
pation is associated to k = 0, i.e., in case of a local doubt, agents are sharing
a common confidence about the future market performance of the asset, and
thus decide to buy instead of selling. On the opposite side, a full generalized
pessimistic anticipation about the current asset or market leads the agents
to choose the selling position in case of a local doubt. Heterogeneity among
agent anticipations is accounted by having 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 as the average market
anticipation between the two extreme cases of euphoria (k = 1) and depres-
sion (k = 1). The net pressure on the price shifts from p0 = 2b0 − 1 to
p1 = 2b1 − 1. Rewriting Eq.(2) as p1 as a function of p0 yields,
p1 =
−4p30 + 12p0 + 3(1− 2k)(1− p20)2
8
. (3)
3.1 The fully optimistic anticipation
Figure (1) shows Eq. (3) for a full optimistic anticipation at k = 0. It
exhibits two attractors at pS = −1 and pB = 1 separated by a threshold, a
tipping point located at pc,0 =
2−
√
13
3
≈ −0.535. For p0 < pc,0 the update
yields p1 < pc,0 while p1 > pc,0 gives p1 > p0. Since pc,0 < 0 the update has
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reduced the signal fuzziness in the first case but increases it in the second
case if p0 < 0. Accordingly agents keep on updating to get a cleat cut signal
with a deterministic choice shared by all agents within a limit choice, either
up or down as seen from Figure (1). At this stage, it is worth to notice from
the Figure that between pc,0 and the point at zero pressure, the pressure is
negative and yet drives up the buyers proportion where it should naturally
drives it down. In the area pc,0 < p0 < 0 the market trend is deficient but as
soon as the zero pressure point is passed by, the market recovers its efficiency
with increasing positive pressures. On the other extreme, when p0 < pc, the
market is efficient at once, reducing till reaching the attractor −1.
Figure 1: The variation of p1 as a function of p0 from Eq. (3) within a fully
optimistic anticipation (k = 0). The market is deficient is the region pc,0 <
p0 < 0 and efficient for p0 > 0 and p0 < pc,0 with pc,0 =
2−
√
13
3
≈ −0.535.
3.2 The fully pessimistic anticipation
Figure (2) shows Eq. (3) for a full pessimistic anticipation at k = 1. It
exhibits the same two attractors at pS = −1 and pB = 1 as for the fully
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optimistic case but now the tipping point is located at a positive value pc,1 =
−2+
√
13
3
≈ 0.535. For p0 < pc,1 the update yields p1 < pc,1 while p1 > pc,1 gives
p1 > p0. At contrast with the fully optimistic case, when 0 < p0 < pc,1 the
update increased the fuzziness by reducing a positive pressure till it cancels
and only the once it is turns negative, does the market becomes efficient. For
p0 > pc,1 the market is efficient at once as seen from Figure (2).
Figure 2: The variation of p1 as a function of p0 from Eq. (3) within a
fully optimistic anticipation (k = 1). The market is deficient is the region
pc,1 < p0 < 0 and efficient for p0 > 0 and p0 < pc,1 with pc,1 =
−2+
√
13
3
≈ 0.535.
3.3 The mixed anticipation
Above two cases of a fully optimistic and pessimistic anticipations assumed
all agents are sharing precisely the same anticipation at the same time. Com-
bining those two extremes cases yields a mixed population with optimistic
and pessimistic agents with an average anticipation 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 of the pop-
ulation, which accounts for a shaded anticipation as expressed in Eq. (3)
[28, 29]. To determine the efficient/deficient regimes of the corresponding
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market, the fixed point equation p1 = p0 is solved, yielding the same attrac-
tors pS = −1 and pB = 1 separated by a threshold, a tipping point now
located at,
pc,k =
−2 +
√
13− 36k + 36k2
3(2k − 1) , (4)
with pc,0 =
2−
√
13
3
≈ −0.535 and pc,1 = −2+
√
13
3
≈ 0.535.
Figure 3: The variation of the tipping point value pc,k from Eq. (4) as
a function of the average anticipation k. Dark areas around zero pressure,
respectively negative and positive correspond to the elastic part of the market
efficiency., i.e., where the market is deficient.
As seen from Figure (3) the market is deficient in two symmetrical areas.
First one occurs when 0 ≤ k < 1
2
for pc,k < p < 0 (red area), where the
holding of the mini-markets drives a negative pressure toward zero value
instead of heading to pS = −1 before pushing it to positive pressures in
the direction of a clear signal to buy at pB = 1. The reverse occurs when
1
2
< k ≤ 1 for 0 < p < pc,k (dark blue area). Instead of getting an increase
of the positive pressure, it is pushed down to zero before turning negative to
eventually reach a clear signal to sell at pS = −1.
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3.4 The balanced anticipation
When anticipation is perfectly distributed among optimistic and pessimistic
agents, the weighted value of the tie shift reaches k = 1
2
, which in turn makes
the value of the tipping point undetermined with pc,k =
0
0
from Eq. (4).
Going back to Eq. (3) yields for k = 1
2
p1 =
−p30 + 3p0
2
, (5)
which gives still the same attractors pS = −1 and pB = 1 with a tipping
point at pc, 1
2
= 0. Accordingly, the market is always efficient with no zones
of deficiency as seen in Figure (4).
Figure 4: The variation of p1 as a function of p0 from Eq. (3) within a bal-
anced anticipation (k = 1
2
). The market is always efficient with no elasticity
with p0 <
1
2
→ pS = −1 and p0 < 12 → pB = 1.
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4 How it works
From last Section, the rationality of the agents combined with the market
invisible hand results into the appearance of two regimes of market deficiency
with the existence of an elasticity in the effect of market efficiency. While
the aggregated private informations leads a buying or a selling trend, the
current agents anticipation thwarts the efficiency to overcome the real signal
reversing the trend direction. A bubble is formed. However this thwarting
can be implemented only within a fixed range of the initial trend. The
extend of elasticity is a function of the strength of the collectively shared
anticipation. At some point the elasticity breaks down and the true trend is
restored at once and brutally. It is a crash.
To be more explicit, consider an asset at time t = 0 with a distribution
of partial private informations yielding a pressure p10 > 0 within a collective
anticipation weighted by a value k < 1
2
to shift a local mini-market tie into
a buy choice, which yields a tipping point pc,k < 0. All external and internal
conditions are assumed to be stable, i.e., nothing happens which could affect
the current fundamental value.
Given those conditions, agents hold a series of n successive mini-markets
to transform p10 to p
1
1 < p
1
2 < p
1
3 < ... < p
1
n = pB = 1 making the initial fuzzy
signal into a clear cut signal to buy. The market is efficient, thanks to the
invisible hand and the agents rationality. The value of n depends on both p10
and k.
Once the signal is deterministic, corresponding prices go up. At that
moment agents re-actualize their positions starting a second cycle of updates.
Since the prices went up, the discrepancy from the fundamental value has
been reduced and thus the new distribution of random private informations
yields 0 < p20 < p
1
0. Anticipation is unchanged.
Again, the invisible hand and the agents rationality combine to make the
market efficient with the successive pressures p21 < p
2
2 < p
2
3 < ... < p
2
m =
pB = 1 with a number m larger than n since the distance p
2
0 − pB is larger
than p10 − pB.
The same process is iterated since at some number of cycle l the initial
fuzzy pressure pl0 gets negative with p
l
0 < 0. However, although the initial
fuzzy pressure is negative and the invisible hand should drive it towards
pS = −1, since pl0 > pc,k, the efficiency elasticity produces a first series of
negative pressures followed by positive pressures with pl1 < p
l
2 < p
l
3 < ... <
0 < ... < pln = pB = 1. A bubble formation is then initiated.
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A new cycle follows with a negative pressure pl+10 < p
l
0 < 0 but still
with pl+10 > pc,k within the elastic range of the market efficiency. Therefore,
the pressure is pushed up towards a limit up trend. The bubble is formed.
Additional cycles increases the number of updates to reverse the trend before
reaching pB = 0 reinforcing the bubble.
However, without any notice, at some moment a new cycle c is initiated
at some value satisfying pr0 < pc,k < 0 while all previous initial values satisfied
pr0 > pc,k. Having cross the elasticity limit, the market is efficient and the
invisible hand pushes down the pressure till reaching the limit down clear
signal at pS = −1 in only a few updates since the distance pr0 − pS is much
smaller than pr−10 − pB of the precedent cycle. The bubble crashes.
4.1 An illustration
Figure (5) shows above different cycles and steps in the case of a fully opti-
mistic anticipation (k = 0). The market starts at a higher pressure to buy
at p10 = 0.90, which means the current price is highly undervalued with 95%
of agents having the right private information. In one step, the signal to
buy gets clear to everyone. Due to the buying, the price is corrected and at
the next cycle, the pressure is at p20 = 0.80 and 3 step are required to reach
pB = 1. We artificially assume for the shake of illustration that every cycle
produces a −0.10 correction to the initial pressure, i.e., pj+10 = pj0−0.10. The
market has been fully efficient with a price reaching the fundamental value
at p100 = 0 after 9 successive cycles. At this stage, the market should have
gotten stable with equal number of buying and selling agents.
However, due to the fully optimistic state of the market, the price keeps
on changing and now reaches an overvalue leading to a next cycle with an
initial negative value p110 = −0.10. But contrary to a normal local efficiency
making, which should have lead to pS = −1, the signal is thwarted to increase
the pressure till reaching the wrong signal pB = 1. The only difference with
the efficient earlier regime is the larger number of steps required to turn clear
the signal. A bubble is born.
During the following cycles, a buy signal is again obtained increasing step
by step the discrepancy between the fundamental value and the actual price,
although the initial values p0 get lower and lower reflecting those discrepan-
cies. However the anticipation thwarting effect cannot sustain a discrepancy
with the fundamental value resulting into a negative pressure smaller than
pc,0. As soon as as p0 < pc,0 ≈ −0.535, the efficiency is restored brutally at
12
Figure 5: Different cycles and associated steps to reach the clear signal in the
case of a fully optimistic anticipation (k = 0). Fifteen initial pressures from
p10 = 0.90 down to p
16
0 = −0.60 by a decrement of −0.10 are shown. For the
first 9 cycles (p10 = 0.90 → p90 = 0.10, the market is efficient. From p100 = 0
till p150 = −0.50 the market is deficient due to the optimistic anticipation. At
p160 = −0.60, having cross the tipping point pc,0 ≈ −0.535, the efficiency is
restored brutally at once.
once provoking a simultaneous crash with an ending signal at pS = −1. This
breaking of elasticity occurs here at cycle 15 with p160 = −0.60. It is worth
to stress that the number of steps is reduced from 9 for p150 = −0.50 to 6 for
p160 = −0.60.
Figure (6) mimics the process of the anticipation thwarting of the effi-
ciency mechanism in case of a positive anticipation similarly to cartoons (Tom
and Jerry) where the main character Tom the cat, runs after the mouse Jerry
and keeps running in the void before realizing it is running in the void and
then, at once falls down.
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Figure 6: The process of the anticipation thwarting of the efficiency mecha-
nism in case of a positive anticipation (k = 0). It is similar to cartoons (like
Tom and Jerry) where the main character Tom the cat, runs after the mouse
Jerry and at some point keeps on running in the void before realizing it is
running in the void and then, at once falls down. At balanced anticipations
(k = 1
2
), the net signal would move smoothly from buy (pB = +1) to sell
(pS = −1).
4.2 Anticipation collapse driven crashes
Above illustration shows how the local market making, which implements the
market efficiency does break momentally the efficiency within some range of
private information, before recovering a full efficiency. The crash of a bubble
is organically linked to its creation. All the process occurs given fixed external
conditions.
However, while in the elastic efficiency regime, the bubble can be crashed
at once driven by a sudden change of the external conditions, provided those
changes shift at once the anticipation from optimistic to pessimistic. Such
a situation was implemented during the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis with
the September 15 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, which all of a sudden has
14
Figure 7: An initial pressure p0 = −0.50 is shown with respectively an opti-
mistic (k = 0) and a pessimistic anticipation (k = 1). In the first case, the
local market making drives the signal towards pB = +1 while in the second
case the driving is towards pS = −1. For k = 0, being in the deficient zone,
8 steps are required to reach the thwarted clear signal but with k = 1, being
in an efficiency zone, the clear signal is reached within only 2 steps.
project the collective anticipation into a fully pessimistic state.
An illustration is exhibited in Figure (7) with an initial pressure p0 =
−0.50 with respectively an optimistic (k = 0) and a pessimistic anticipation
(k = 1). In the first case, the local market making drives the signal towards
pB = +1 while in the second case the driving is towards pS = −1. For k = 0,
being in the deficient zone, 8 steps are required to reach the thwarted clear
signal but with k = 1, being in an efficiency zone, the clear signal is reached
within only 2 steps. Therefore, jumping from an optimistic market into a
pessimistic market, within an elastic efficiency zone, the signal is turned at
once from +1 into −1 provoking a crash.
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5 Conclusion
Applying the sociophysics Galam model of opinion dynamics to marker dy-
namics we have been able to construct an efficient market using an invisible
hand to aggregate individuals private information to have the fundamental
price reflected in the making of the current price. The process is built on
through a series of sequential local market aggregations of private informa-
tion to turn a fuzzy initial signal leading to a probabilistic distribution of
individual choices, onto a deterministic clear signal to either buy or sell. It
is worth to underline that the number of those micro markets steps is found
to be a rather small number.
The rational agent hypothesis is shown to be instrumental in turning on
the dynamics of market efficiency. However in so doing, due to the incom-
pressible existence of agents anticipation, an elasticity has been disclosed
in the efficiency dynamical process. It is this very elasticity, which on one
hand produces spontaneous rational bubble, and on the other hand, crashes
down those bubbles once the limit of elasticity is reached, breaking down the
temporary deficiency.
Sudden shifts of agent anticipations were also shown to create market
crashes through sharp inversions of the efficiency elasticity range, which in
turn produces sharp readjustments.
Having identified the source of bubble-crash phenomena, we are in a po-
sition to determine a methodology to avert their occurrence. Indeed the
efficiency elasticity should be suppressed to keep efficiency at a rigid status.
Such a scheme requires to suppress the direction of anticipation about a given
asset and or a market, which means to have k = 1
2
. Such a constraint can be
implemented using two different paths.
First path would demand to have on average an equal distribution of
agents according to positive and negative anticipations. Such a constraint is
hardly manageable in solid terms.
Second path is easy to implement, at least in principle. It would require
to have agents to toss a coin collectively at each case in which their local
aggregated private information lead to a zero pressure choice, in order to
make a choice to buy or to sell, and thus ignoring their own anticipation.
From a rational stand, such a random practice would be be very hard to
be followed psychologically since by nature people involved on a market are
anticipating some outcome while making their respective choices. Moreover,
if the practice is undertaken by part of the agents and not by the others, the
16
elasticity will not be suppressed.
It thus seem that bullish and perish dynamics are inherent to the existence
of both a rational agent and an efficient market dynamics. Future work
will include the study of having heterogeneity in the composition of agent
behavior. In addition to rational agents, who make up their choices according
to their private information rescaled by the local market aggregations, we
will investigate the effect of stubborn and contrarian agents [30, 31] on the
elasticity range. Stubborn agents keep on their initial choice independently
of outcomes of local market aggregations while contrarian agents decides
against the local market outcomes.
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